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Chapter 1 Overview
The Addis Ababa Peace Accord of 1972 was hailed as a unique example of a negotiated peace settlement in Africa and the third world in general. It was regarded as a unique not only because the leaders of the Sudan and its conflicting factions had managed to overcome their differences and opted for negotiated peace after seventeen long years of war and roaring guns, but also because it was negotiated by African partners at the peak of the "cold war" where every faction could easily have found allies with massive arms supplies.
Although the actual achievements of the peace accord and the political and institutional arrangements proved to have been exaggerated, the agreement showed that, even in the most complex conflicts, it is possible to trade guns and havoc for diplomacy and negotiations. However, the optimism which was precipitated by this "unprecedented" negotiated settlement of a complicated political armed conflict, and the feeling of national unity, were soon to be eroded by a combination of what Professor Ali Mazrui called "forces of anarchy" on the one side, and "forces of tyranny" on the other. "Africa" Mazrui writes, "was torn between the forces of anarchy on one side, in the sense of decentralized violence, and the forces of tyranny, in the sense of orchestrated centralized repression."
The spirit of the Addis Ababa Agreement was gradually but consistently undermined and eventually eroded by the same political leaders whose courage was applauded by the world when it brought about the peace settlement. Despite the fact that the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 had stipulated that the three provinces of the South should constitute an autonomous region with its capital at Juba, for reasons of political expediency, the President of the Sudan decreed on 1 June 1983 the division of the South into three regions. 1 In September 1983 Islam Sharia law was also introduced by a presidential decree that reinforced the differences between the North and the South. Civil war returned again in 1983 and it continues unabated today.
When the conflict was renewed in 1983, the warring parties expected it to end quickly.
The Governments viewed the rebellion as an illegitimate action by outlaws that could be thwarted by police action or as a manifestation of grievances that could be contained by rebels into the political system. Groups that challenged the regime considered the system already so decayed that it could be easily toppled, and also led them to believe that a simple change in the top leadership will accomplish their goals.
The military officers who launched the guerrilla struggle sought to transform the country's political structure. They recognized that an extended period of time would be required and systematically built up their fighting capacity. Their efforts brought them to the brink of success in 1989 when a broad range of sociopolitical groups pressed the government to negotiate a fundamental resolution of the issues that had caused the civil war.
2 But the seizure of power by hard-line military forces in that year preempted negotiations and exabated polarization. The new government insisted on total victory and wanted to impose its own ideological vision on the society, a vision diametrically opposed
Background
The Republic of the Sudan is the largest country in Africa. Almost one million square miles in area, it stretches from the Sahara desert in the north to tropical rain forests in the south. Its 23 million inhabitants, scattered across this wide expanse of land, represent a complex diversity of ethnic origins, religions, languages and lifestyles. The ethnic composition of the Sudan is roughly one third "Arab"; one third "Southerners" and one third "others" (such as Nubians, Fur and Nuba). In religious terms, the majority of the Sudanese consider themselves Muslims. However, the religious orientation of traditional Southerners is animism. Moreover many southern leaders consider themselves followers of various Christian faiths established during the Anglo-Egyptian condominium ). 1 During the Anglo-Egyptian rule of the Sudan, the British were mainly occupied with establishing control and maintaining order. In the north Messianic movements continued to appear but were put down, as Mahdist writings and organizations were outlawed. In the South there was protracted resistance to British efforts to establish control. In economic terms, the integration of the country continued in the form of expanded railway system and plans were made for a large agricultural project in the Gezira. By the time of independence (1956), there was considerable economic development in the north, but little had been done to encourage comparable growth in the south.
The limited education development in the 1920s had created a small but articulate educated class in the Sudan. After early cooperation with the colonial system, this group began to grow dissatisfied with their prospects and the lack of possibilities for self-rule.
Due to their anti-British tone, they found a natural alliance with Egyptian nationalists.
They organized a series of demonstrations that culminated a military mutiny led by southern soldiers. Startled by this movement, the British reacted strongly by crushing the movement, expelling all the Egyptian officials and limiting the role of educated Sudanese.
In the ensuing turmoil the British became more active, trying to create instruments for controlling political development. The early step was the creation of the Advisory Council for Northern Sudan in 1944. 2 The activists objected because it had only advisory functions, excluded the south Sudan, and consisted largely of traditional leaders, and so they boycotted the council. The Legislative Assembly was formed in 1948 and was an elected body including both the northern and southern representatives. Unionists also boycotted it and the Assembly was dominated by the earlier created Umma Party. In international terms, the Anglo-Egyptian stalemate over the British role in Egypt made agreement on the Sudan impossible. In the Sudan itself the basic pillars around which politics revolved were the opposing nationalist themselves of unity or separate independence, the sectarian rivalries and the struggle of the educated class to define its role more clearly.
However, the resolution came suddenly, with the key being the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. The new Egyptian leadership was more flexible with regard to the Sudan issue.
Political issues were made less confusing and elections were held in 1953 when the National Union Party ( NUP ) won, followed closely by the Umma Party and the only large block of representatives was made up of the Southern members Liberal Party.
The NUP had supported a unity of the Nile region but political developments changed perspectives. As the Sudan moved towards the time of self-determination, the pro-unity people became convinced of the viability of a separate independent Sudan. Independence was voted by the NUP-led parliament and on 1 Jan 1956, the British withdrew and the Sudan became an independent state. One cloud had arisen on the horizon in 1955.
Southerners were upset by the limited role given them in the Sudanization of the Government and they feared northern dominance. The issue of integrating the south into the independent Sudan became a major problem.
For the Southern Sudanese, the end of British colonialism in their land meant the beginning of Arab domination and colonialism. 3 That was unacceptable and needed to be challenged in order to preserve Southern Sudanese identity and to gain their selfdetermination. For the Northern Sudanese, the British withdrawal meant assumption of political power and also meant gaining sovereign status in the Sudan which, in their view, included the South, as well. Any challenge to political and constitutional arrangements worked out with the departing imperial power by any group, such as the Southern 
Chapter 3
The Addis Ababa Accords According to the Addis Ababa Agreement, the entire South would comprise one region, with its own assembly and elected executive. 1 The region had an independent budget and tax source to control internal security and local administration in the social, cultural, and education fields. English, rather than Arabic, was recognized as the principle language in the South. Moreover the Addis Ababa agreement specified that the guerrilla forces, known as Anya Nya, would be gradually absorbed into the army and would serve in the South, Southerners thereby relinquish their demand for independence in return for gaining substantial self-rule and protection from pressure from the center.
to locate the oil refinery in the North, near Kosti, and to pipe most of the oil outside of the The SPLM/SPLA has grown from a small band of mutineers in 1983 to a broad-based movement that controls nearly all the South and allies itself with all the political groups opposing the regime. If the alliance can manage to hold together and overthrow the government, the SPLM might realize its far reaching aspirations. If, however, the government wards off those challenges, the protracted conflict could continue to wreck havoc on the society and the economy. With government and opposition pursuing their struggle in zero sum terms, no compromise appears possible 
Chapter 4 The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)
The SPLM is a revolutionary political force currently fighting the Sudan government.
Its aims are crystallized soon after its establishment in 1983. The SPLM articulated comprehensive goals: the creation of "a united Sudan under a socialist system that affords democracy and human rights to all nationalities and guarantees freedom to all religions, beliefs, and outlooks. A united and a socialist Sudan can be achieved only through protracted revolutionary armed struggle. Peaceful struggle has always been met with ruthless suppression and callous killing of our beloved people." The SPLM's aims are all highly political. The movement was organized along military lines, since force was its primary tool for pressurizing and overthrowing the government. Because SPLM leaders believed that negotiations would not succeed without control over territory and considerable military leverage, diplomacy was initially viewed as secondary. Although, a joint SPLM/SPLA high command governed the movement, the primary responsibilities of its senior members were to command particular battlefronts. Decision making was complicated and slow, since messages had to be sent to far flung officers, response collated, and further discussion carried out before agreement could be reached on major policies and diplomatic issued. Meetings were logistically difficult to arrange and relatively infrequent. Garang wielded special power. As the premier commander articulated the goals of the movement with authority, he provided direction of the overall military campaigns and served as the leading diplomatic envoy.
Senior officers played prominent public roles in meetings with political groups and negotiating significant agreements.
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Until May 1991, the SPLM had its political headquarters in Addis Ababa and maintained its liaison offices in Nairobi and London. The Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), which provides humanitarian aid in the SPLA-controlled areas, also has its headquarters in Nairobi. In practice, SRRA operations are controlled by SPLA officers in the field, even though the SRRA is legally independent.
Garang's concern for political coherence within the movement merged with his belief that maintaining the unity of political and military cadres was essential for long term success. SPLM leaders remembered that the Anya Nya rebellion suffered from military fragmentation and the conflicting ambitions of rival politicians; the movement could negotiate effectively with the central government only after Col. Joseph Lagu forcibly united the factions. 3 The SPLM/SPLA faced competition initially from the emerging separatist Anya Nya movement, called Anya Nya II, whose leaders had deserted the armed forces shortly before the Bor. mutiny. They expected him, senior in age and rank to Garang and the 1200 men from Bor and Pibor-to come under the authority of Anya Nya II. Instead, in Garang's words, the SPLA waged a "bitter struggle" from June to
November 1983 before the "correct direction prevailed" and the SPLA killed or won over the "separatist reactionaries, and opportunists." The remaining Anya Nya II received arms and funds from the government; Anya Nya II was a low cost way to harass the SPLA.
Nonetheless, after prolonged negotiations, the SPLM appointed the most effective Anya Nya II commander, Gordon Kong Chuol, to the SPLM/SPLS high command in 
Notes
Foreign Relationship
The SPLM leadership sought good relationship with foreign countries that could provide sanctuary, material assistance, and diplomatic support. Chapter 6
Military Operations
The SPLA strategy was to undermine the government and the armed forces on the South by mounting protracted operations that would wear them down. Ethiopian border from Jokau to Kapoeta was thus secured; the SPLA were able to control a continuous stretch of territory from the border to northern Bar al-Ghazal; forces in eastern Equatoria were able to concentrate around Juba without fear of army garrisons to their rear; and the Sudanese army could no longer bring its Mombasa shipped supplies through Nimule, but had to divert them to the longer Kaya road through Zaire. The SPLA now held three former provincial capitals; Torit, Bor, and Nasir. In addition to that, the fall of Torit left the SPLA with some heavy equipment, including tanks and long range artillery.
The territorial gains presented the SPLA with new challenges and opportunities.
Militarily the SPLA has been tempted to alter its strategy from guerrilla to convention The sharp decrease in financial and arms support to the SPLA, just as it faced the increased costs of providing for refugees fleeing Ethiopia and displaced persons, risked overwhelming rudimentary administrative structure. Moreover, the SPLA is lacking the capacity to move north towards Khartoum. Despite its control over nearly one-third of the country, the SPLA realized the fighting has reached a stalemate.
Notes
Perspectives from Khartoum
The transitional period after the overthrow of Numairy was one in which ideals frantically competed with a fluid context, with conflicting factions searching for points of anchor and leverage. Rivalries and alignment of factions along these idealistic lines were not restricted to North and South relations, but were beginning to be expressed within the North and South. As a result, the country was becoming torn apart, indeed shattered, while the factions only saw the pieces on which they stood or which fell around them. General Abd al-Rahman Siwar al-Dahad, the military leader of the regime and Dr.
Jizouli Daffala, its prime minister, were unwavering on the issue, although they were also quite sincere about some form of diversification permit the application of different systems to different religious communities, not only in private, but also in public affairs. How a system of diversity with equality could be designed was a matter of detail that they did not venture to address. 
Chapter 8
Obstacles to a Peaceful Resolution
The concern of both parties to the conflict was not only the tragic loss of lives and human suffering which the war was causing to the South, but the extent to which it had uprooted masses of people, dislodged them from their natural habitat, and divested them of the cultural, moral and spiritual values that had nourished their sense of identity and dignity as a people. Although much of the physical damage continued to be concentrated in the south, and therefore not sufficiently felt in the north, it had become increasingly recognized that the war was not only overburdening the ailing national economy, but was also causing a level of militarization, factionalization and proliferation of weaponry that could turn the Sudan into another Lebanon.
Until the Koka Dam Declaration of March 1986, Northern political forces did not realize fully that the SPLM would refuse a political settlement based on the Addis Ababa Accord and would insist on adhering to its comprehensive program to transform the government from the centre. For the North, according limited self-rule to the South was easier than countenancing a fundamental shift in power in Khartoum. By November 1985, however, the transitional government accepted Garang's idea of convening a constitutional conference to establish agreed upon legal bases for the political system. But the government was not willing to annul the September laws prior to the conference, as the SPLA demanded. Both prepare for advantage on the ground, believing that the other side would not make significant political concessions until it was hurt militarily. The continued fighting, in turn, made each side more suspicious of the other's intentions.
Attempts at personal diplomacy between Mahdi and Garang failed to bridge the gap:
Mahdi tried to bypass the Koka Dam, which Garang insisted was the only legitimate framework of negotiations. Mahdi claimed Garang had negotiated in bad faith when the SPLA subsequently shot down a civilian airplane. Garang claimed that Mahdi intended to accelerate the war by turning to Libya for additional bombers and shooting down the peace process itself by refusing to engage in further meetings with him.
In effect each side decided to reserve its substantive differences until a conference was convened. The military high command had to intervene to resolve the crisis with its ultimatum in February 1989. The officers forced Mahdi to form a broad-based government that excluded NIF and to make the DUP's chief negotiator with the SPLM the foreign minister in charge of finalizing arrangements for a constitutional conference. This paved way for the government and parliament to formally endorse the DUP-SPLA accord, and parliament voted to shelf debate on the Islamic laws until the constitutional conference.
The SPLA responded with a cease-fire on 1 May, and both sides agreed that the state of emergence would end simultaneously with the beginning of a permanent cease-fire just before the constitutional conference would convene on 18 September. The peace process was at an advanced stage when the military officers took over power the same year. 
